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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
After American Sterilizer Company ("AMSCO") placed him 
on workers' compensation leave, channel welder Robert 
Krouse filed this action against AMSCO and Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company, asserting retaliation claims under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq. 
(ADA), and discrimination claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. S 621 et seq. 
(ADEA). Relying on McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 
610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 958 (1997), the 
district court determined that Krouse was judicially 
estopped from claiming to be a "qualified individual with a 
disability" under the ADA based on prior assertions of total 
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disability made in connection with applications for 
disability and pension benefits. Since Krouse was estopped 
from claiming to be a "qualified individual with a disability," 
the court reasoned, Krouse could not invoke the protection 
of the ADA. Alternatively, the court held that Krouse's ADA 
claims failed on the merits as a matter of law. The court 
also held that Krouse's ADEA claims failed as a matter of 
law. The district court granted the defendants' motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
We hold that a person's status as a "qualified individual 
with a disability" is not relevant in assessing the person's 
claim for retaliation under the ADA. Thus, the district court 
erred in relying on McNemar to dismiss Krouse's ADA 
retaliation claims. We also hold, however, that Krouse's 
ADA and ADEA claims must fail on the merits as a matter 
of law. Krouse is unable to articulate a prima facie case of 
retaliation, and he is unable to offer any evidence which 
would permit a trier of fact to conclude that AMSCO's 
articulated reasons for its employment decisions were a 
mere pretext for unlawful retaliation or discrimination. We 
will affirm the judgment of the district court. Since we do 
not rely on McNemar in affirming the judgment of the 
district court, we are not prompted to revisit that 
controversial decision at this time. 
 
I. 
 
AMSCO designs, manufactures, sells and services 
hospital equipment. Krouse began employment with 
AMSCO in 1974 as a member of the bargaining unit 
represented by Local 832 of the United Auto Workers 
("UAW"). In 1989, Krouse became a channel welder. 
AMSCO evaluates channel welders pursuant to established 
performance and time standards set by AMSCO's industrial 
engineers for the completion of various work projects. 
Employees' "performance percentages" are calculated every 
week; fully trained channel welders are expected to pursue 
the applicable performance percentage standards. 
 
On January 14, 1991, Krouse suffered a work-related 
back injury. Following this injury, Krouse's advising health 
care professionals placed certain medical restrictions on the 
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type of activity he could perform. From January 15, 1991 
through May 20, 1994, AMSCO provided work assignments 
for Krouse that complied with his medical restrictions. 
From April 21, 1993 to June 21, 1993, Krouse was 
assigned to the Transitional Work Group ("TWG"), which 
provides light-duty work for employees who have suffered 
temporary injuries or illness. While Krouse was assigned to 
the TWG, AMSCO implemented requested modifications to 
the channel welder position in anticipation of his return. 
 
Prior to his return to the channel welder position in June 
1993, Krouse's doctor modified his medical restrictions and 
indicated that Krouse was able to perform the essential 
functions of the modified position. From January 1 to May 
20, 1994, Krouse's performance percentages ranged 
between sixteen and thirty percent of the expected 
performance standard; other fully trained channel welders 
performed at or above fifty percent of the expected 
standard. During a March 31, 1994, meeting with Krouse's 
supervisor to discuss Krouse's performance level, Krouse 
stated that, since he was not "living up to" the supervisor's 
expectations, he was going to go home. Krouse's 
chiropractor excused Krouse from work the next day on the 
ground that he was totally disabled. 
 
On April 20, 1994, Krouse received a medical release to 
return to work. After reviewing the medical restrictions 
imposed by the chiropractor, Krouse admitted that no 
further accommodations were necessary to allow him to 
perform the essential functions of the modified channel 
welder position. Krouse also stated, however, that he was 
working to the highest percentage possible. AMSCO advised 
Krouse that his performance percentages were 
unacceptable. Krouse responded that AMSCO should 
provide Krouse with an assistant. 
 
During this meeting, AMSCO also expressed concern 
about Krouse's frequent absences from work. During the 
eleven-month period in which he held the modified channel 
welder position, Krouse left the facility without prior notice 
more than fifty times for unscheduled visits with his 
chiropractor. Krouse's unscheduled absences often left 
AMSCO without a welder to perform critical production 
functions and resulted in substantial production delays and 
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backlogs. AMSCO asked Krouse to schedule appointments 
in advance, but Krouse responded that he could not 
guarantee the frequency or the time of his appointments. 
 
On May 3, 1994, AMSCO performed another review of 
Krouse's performance and found that it ranged between 
twenty-five and thirty percent. Based on this evaluation, 
coupled with Krouse's admission that he was working to 
the highest percentage possible, AMSCO concluded that 
Krouse could not perform the essential functions of the 
channel welder position. AMSCO had provided Krouse all of 
the accommodations and modifications requested by his 
physician, and there were no other vacant positions 
available which Krouse could perform. On May 23, 1994, 
AMSCO placed Krouse on workers' compensation leave. 
 
On February 21, 1995, Krouse was placed in a modified 
Dismantle and Tag position for which he had bid. This job 
required Krouse to perform duties which were consistent 
with his medical restrictions. Krouse returned to leave 
status on April 21, 1995, however, and he has not since 
returned to active status. 
 
II. 
 
On October 21, 1993, Krouse filed an action, Civ.A. No. 
93-313-ERIE ("Krouse I"), alleging that AMSCO 
discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the 
ADA. On August 8, 1995, the district court dismissed 
Krouse I with prejudice because of Krouse's failure to 
prosecute it. See Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 928 F. 
Supp. 543, 544 & n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1996). Krouse did not 
appeal that order. 
 
On November 10, 1994, Krouse filed a second action, 
Civ.A. No. 94-309-ERIE ("Krouse II"), against AMSCO and 
Liberty Mutual, AMSCO's workers' compensation carrier. 
Krouse alleged retaliation under the ADA and age 
discrimination under the ADEA. On March 6, 1995, Krouse 
filed a third action, Civ.A. No. 95-55-ERIE ("Krouse III"), 
against AMSCO and Liberty Mutual. Krouse raised 
additional ADA retaliation and ADEA discrimination claims. 
On June 30, 1995, the district court consolidated Krouse II 
and Krouse III. 
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In his consolidated complaints, Krouse alleged that 
AMSCO retaliated against him for filing ADA charges with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in October 
1992. Specifically, Krouse alleged that AMSCO retaliated 
by: (1) placing Krouse on workers' compensation leave on 
May 20, 1994; (2) failing to offer Krouse a disability 
pension; and (3) refusing to create an alternative position 
as a "Long Service Employee" under the collective 
bargaining agreement between AMSCO and the UAW. 
Krouse also alleged that AMSCO and Liberty Mutual 
harassed him by requiring him to undergo a functional 
capacity examination pursuant to the Pennsylvania 
Workers' Compensation Act. Krouse's age discrimination 
claims largely mirrored his ADA retaliation allegations. In 
his ADEA claims, Krouse alleged that the above 
employment decisions were motivated by age animus. With 
the possible exception of his harassment claim, Krouse did 
not allege disability discrimination under the ADA in the 
consolidated complaints.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although Krouse did allege disability discrimination in Krouse I, those 
allegations were dismissed with the complaint and were not raised again. 
On appeal, Krouse attempts to argue issues relating to disability 
discrimination and failure to accommodate that were not raised in his 
consolidated complaints. Krouse's failure to include these claims in his 
consolidated complaints is fatal to his efforts here. 
 
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must 
provide a defendant with "fair notice of what the plaintiff 's claim is 
and 
the grounds upon which it rests." Williams v. New Castle County, 970 
F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 
41, 47 (1957)). Although the background sections of the complaints in 
Krouse II and Krouse III refer briefly to AMSCO's alleged failure to 
accommodate Krouse's disability, the complaints specifically allege that 
each of the injuries for which Krouse seeks recovery under the ADA was 
based on unlawful retaliation or harassment. Indeed, Krouse 
acknowledged at his deposition that his ADA claims were based on 
retaliation, not failure to accommodate. 
 
Although a complaint's allegations are to be construed favorably to the 
pleader, Williams, 970 F.2d at 1266, we will not read causes of action 
into a complaint when they are not present. The ADA is one statutory 
scheme, but it provides more than one cause of action. Where, as here, 
a plaintiff asserts a cause of action for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 
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On September 28, 1996, the district court granted the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment as to each of 
Krouse's causes of action. Krouse appealed.2 
 
III. 
 
We begin our analysis by examining the framework for 
deciding a claim of unlawful retaliation under the ADA. The 
ADA retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a), states that 
"[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual 
because such individual has opposed any act or practice 
made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual 
made a charge . . . under [the ADA]." Id. This provision is 
similar to Title VII's prohibition of retaliation. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-3(a). Accordingly, we analyze ADA retaliation 
claims under the same framework we employ for retaliation 
claims arising under Title VII. Stewart v. Happy Herman's 
Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 
1997); Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 
(1st Cir. 1997). This framework will vary depending on 
whether the suit is characterized as a "pretext" suit or a 
"mixed motives" suit. See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 
F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997), petition for cert.filed, 66 
U.S.L.W. 3157 (U.S. Aug. 4, 1997) (No. 97-266). Krouse 
proceeded under a "pretext" theory, and so will our 
analysis. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
S 12203(a), we will not find an implicit cause of action for failure to 
accommodate under 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a). This is true even when the 
complaint's background section makes a brief reference to failure to 
accommodate. AMSCO was not placed on "fair notice" that Krouse 
intended to pursue a failure to accommodate claim. 
 
2. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We conduct a de novo 
review of the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor 
of the appellees. We must apply the same test used by the district court; 
namely, we must be satisfied that there is "no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether to affirm 
the 
district court's order granting the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment, we must draw all inferences in favor of Krouse, as the non- 
moving party. 
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We begin, as all "pretext" cases begin, with the prima 
facie case. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) protected 
employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either 
after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected 
activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee's 
protected activity and the employer's adverse action. 
Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920 (prima facie case of retaliation 
under Title VII); Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 
(3d Cir. 1991) (same); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 
708 (3d Cir. 1989) (same); see also Stewart, 117 F.3d at 
1287 (prima facie case of retaliation under ADA); Morgan v. 
Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); 
Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16 (same). 
 
If an employee establishes a prima facie case of 
retaliation under the ADA, the burden shifts to the 
employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for 
its adverse employment action. Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920 
n.2. The employer's burden at this stage is "relatively light: 
it is satisfied if the defendant articulates any legitimate 
reason for the [adverse employment action]; the defendant 
need not prove that the articulated reason actually 
motivated the [action]." Id. 
 
If the employer satisfies its burden, the plaintiff must be 
able to convince the factfinder both that the employer's 
proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was the 
real reason for the adverse employment action. Id.; see also 
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993) ("It 
is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder 
must believe the plaintiff 's explanation of intentional 
discrimination.") (emphasis omitted); Sheridan v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067-68 (3d Cir. 
1996) (en banc) (explaining how plaintiff may satisfy 
burden), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2532 (1997). The plaintiff 
must prove that retaliatory animus played a role in the 
employer's decisionmaking process and that it had a 
determinative effect on the outcome of that process. 
Woodson, 109 F.3d at 931-35 (discussing proper standard 
to apply in Title VII retaliation case). The burden of proof 
remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id. at 920 n.2. 
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To obtain summary judgment, the employer must show 
that the trier of fact could not conclude, as a matter of law, 
(1) that retaliatory animus played a role in the employer's 
decisionmaking process and (2) that it had a determinative 
effect on the outcome of that process. This may be 
accomplished by establishing the plaintiff's inability to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to either: (1) one or 
more elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case or, (2) if 
the employer offers a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for 
the adverse employment action, whether the employer's 
proffered explanation was a pretext for retaliation. See Jalil, 
873 F.2d at 708 (explaining shifting burdens under Title VII 
retaliation); see also Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287 (explaining 
shifting burdens under ADA retaliation). 
 
The district court offered two alternative grounds for 
granting AMSCO's motion for summary judgment on 
Krouse's ADA retaliation claims. First, the court concluded 
that Krouse was judicially estopped from asserting his 
status as a "qualified individual with a disability" and was 
therefore not protected by the ADA. Second, the court 
concluded that Krouse failed to establish a case of 
retaliation, both because Krouse failed to establish a prima 
face case and because Krouse failed to adduce any evidence 
rebutting AMSCO's articulated reasons for its employment 
decisions. 
 
A. 
 
The district court concluded that in order to come within 
the protection of the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that he 
or she is a "qualified individual with a disability." Slip Op. 
at 12 (citing 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a)). The court concluded 
that Krouse was judicially estopped from asserting his 
status as a "qualified individual with a disability" by virtue 
of his previous assertions of total disability in connection 
with applications for Social Security disability insurance 
benefits, disability pension benefits, and disability credit 
insurance benefits. 
 
In Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 
81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996), we stated that "absent any good 
explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain an 
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advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an 
inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible 
theory." Id. at 358 (quotation omitted). We held that the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel, which prevents a litigant from 
asserting a position inconsistent with one previously 
asserted, applies when: (1) the party's position is 
inconsistent with a position taken in the same or in a 
previous proceeding and (2) the party asserted either or 
both of the inconsistent positions in bad faith. Id. at 361. 
 
In McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 958 (1997), the plaintiff 
claimed that he was discharged from his employment due 
to his HIV-positive status in violation of the ADA. The 
district court determined that McNemar was judicially 
estopped from claiming status as a "qualified individual 
with a disability" under the ADA based on his prior sworn 
statements, made in his application for Social Security 
disability benefits, New Jersey state disability benefits, and 
an exemption from repayment of an educational loan from 
the Pennsylvania Higher Education Agency, that he was 
totally and permanently disabled and unable to work. Id. at 
615-16. 
 
We affirmed the judgment of the district court. We 
reasoned: 
 
       McNemar has represented to one federal agency and to 
       the agencies of two different states that he was totally 
       disabled and unable to work--while now, in claiming 
       relief under the [ADA], he states that he is a qualified 
       person with a disability . . . . 
 
Id. at 618 (internal quotation omitted). We observed that 
McNemar's previous statements were "unconditional 
assertions as to his disability" and inability to work. Id. 
(quotation omitted, emphasis supplied). We concluded that 
"the district court was well within its discretion to hold that 
McNemar is estopped from arguing now that he is`qualified' 
under the ADA." Id. at 617 (internal quotation omitted). 
 
The district court applied McNemar to this case and 
concluded that Krouse was barred by the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel from asserting status as a "qualified 
individual with a disability." Slip Op. at 17. Since Krouse 
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was estopped from claiming to be a "qualified individual 
with a disability," the court reasoned, Krouse could not 
invoke the protection of the ADA. 
 
The district court erred in this regard. Unlike a plaintiff 
in an ADA discrimination case, a plaintiff in an ADA 
retaliation case need not establish that he is a "qualified 
individual with a disability." By its own terms, the ADA 
retaliation provision protects "any individual" who has 
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by the ADA or 
who has made a charge under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. 
S 12203(a). This differs from the scope of the ADA disability 
discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a), which may 
be invoked only by a "qualified individual with a disability." 
An individual who is adjudged not to be a "qualified 
individual with a disability" may still pursue a retaliation 
claim under the ADA. Cf. Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16 (plaintiff 
may assert ADA retaliation claim "even if the underlying 
claim of disability fails"). Thus, Krouse was permitted to 
pursue his retaliation claims under the ADA. 
 
McNemar has been the object of considerable criticism.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In a thoughtful opinion, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reasoned that since the Social Security Administration 
does not take into account the possible effect of reasonable 
accommodation on a claimant's ability to work, receipt of Social Security 
benefits cannot automatically preclude an individual from being a 
"qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA, a status that 
expressly considers the possibility of reasonable accommodation. 
Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 584-87 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). The court of appeals squarely rejected McNemar, 
reasoning that "the Third Circuit's decision . . . disregards the fact 
that 
Social Security disability determinations take no account of reasonable 
accommodation." Id. at 587; see also Robinson v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 94 
F.3d 499, 502 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996)(Social Security determinations are "not 
synonymous with a determination of whether a plaintiff is a `qualified 
person' for purposes of the ADA"). Recognizing that the ADA's definition 
of "qualified individual with a disability" differs from the definition of 
"totally disabled" under the Social Security Act, the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that "representations made in benefits 
applications will not be conclusive as to whether one is a `qualified 
individual with a disability' under the ADA." Weigel v. Target Stores, __ 
F.3d __, __ n.6, 1997 WL 526163 (7th Cir. Aug. 26, 1997). 
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Some of this criticism might be well-founded. Nevertheless, 
it is not the role of a panel to revisit a previous panel's 
decision. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1. It may be that this court, 
sitting en banc, will revisit the issue of judicial estoppel in 
this type of case. This is not the case to prompt such a 
discussion. Since Krouse's status as a "qualified individual 
with a disability" has no bearing on the outcome of this 
case, we do not have any reason to review McNemar or to 
ask the entire court to revisit McNemar at this time.4 
McNemar remains the law in this circuit.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
In a comprehensive enforcement guidance, the EEOC stated that the 
court in McNemar "ignored [a] fundamental difference between the ADA 
and [the Social Security Administration] and failed to conduct the 
individual inquiry mandated by the ADA definition of `qualified individual 
with a disability.' . . . McNemar was wrongly decided." EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance on the Effect of Representations Made in 
Applications for Benefits on the Determination of Whether a Person is a 
"Qualified Individual with a Disability" under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)(Feb. 12, 1997), reprinted in 3 EEOC 
Compliance Manual (BNA) N:2281, at 2290 (1997). McNemar was decided 
before the EEOC issued its enforcement guidance. Likewise, the 
associate commissioner of the Social Security Administration wrote in an 
information memorandum that "the ADA and the disability provisions of 
the Social Security Act have different purposes, and have no direct 
application to one another." Daniel L. Skoler, Assoc. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. 
Admin., Disabilities Act Info. Mem., at 2 (June 2, 1993), reprinted in 2 
Social Security Practice Guide, App. S 15C[9], at App. 15-402 (Matthew 
Bender & Co. 1997). McNemar has also been criticized in academia. See, 
e.g., Anne E. Beaumont, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop: Judicial 
Estoppel and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1529, 
1567-68 (1996) (criticizing reasoning behind application of judicial 
estoppel to ADA cases). 
 
4. Judge Becker is persuaded by the authorities set forth in footnote 3 
that McNemar was wrongly decided, and believes that the court should 
reconsider it at its first opportunity. 
 
5. We do take this opportunity to express our concern that district courts 
in this circuit are misapplying McNemar without first considering the 
unique facts of that case. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 618 (McNemar's 
representations were unconditional assertions at to disability and 
inability to work). Here, the district court's error was clear -- since 
Krouse's status as a "qualified individual with a disability" is not 
relevant 
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B. 
 
The district court did not rest its decision to grant 
AMSCO's motion for summary judgment solely on judicial 
estoppel and McNemar. The court also concluded that 
Krouse's retaliation claims failed on the merits as a matter 
of law. 
 
As to Krouse's claim that he was placed on workers' 
compensation leave in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge 
in October 1992, the district court concluded that Krouse 
"adduced no evidence" to support the claim"aside from the 
fact he was placed on worker's compensation some 19 
months after filing an EEOC charge in October, 1992." Slip 
Op. at 22-23. We agree. After carefully reviewing the record, 
we are convinced that Krouse has not proffered any 
evidence establishing a causal connection between his 
EEOC charge and AMSCO's decision to place Krouse on 
workers' compensation leave. 
 
Nineteen months passed between the time Krouse filed 
his EEOC charge and the time AMSCO placed Krouse on 
workers' compensation leave. In Robinson v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997), we held that "the 
mere fact that adverse employment action occurs after a 
complaint will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the 
plaintiff's burden of demonstrating a causal link between 
the two events." Id. at ___. As noted in Robinson, our cases 
are "seemingly split" on the question of whether the timing 
of the allegedly retaliatory action can, by itself, ever support 
a finding of causation. Id. at ___. Compare Woodson, 109 
F.3d at 920 (stating in dicta that "temporal proximity 
between the protected activity and the termination is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to his retaliation claims, the court's reliance on McNemar was misplaced. 
Even where an individual's status as a "qualified individual with a 
disability" is relevant to the resolution of an ADA claim, courts should 
carefully adhere to the two-part test of Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 361, 
before concluding that previous representations as to disability and 
inability to work judicially estop the individual from asserting such 
status. Courts should not assume that McNemar always bars an 
individual's ADA claims merely because prior representations or 
determinations of disability exist in the record. 
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sufficient to establish a causal link") with Delli Santi v. CNA 
Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 199 n.10 (3d Cir. 1996) ("timing 
alone will not suffice to prove retaliatory motive"). We need 
not resolve this apparent conflict here. Even if timing alone 
could ever be sufficient to establish a causal link, we 
believe that the timing of the alleged retaliatory action must 
be "unusually suggestive" of retaliatory motive before a 
causal link will be inferred. Robinson, 120 F.3d at ___; see, 
e.g., Jalil, 873 F.2d at 708 (causal link established where 
"discharge followed rapidly, only two days later, upon 
Avdel's receipt of notice of Jalil's EEOC claim"). Here, the 
timing of the allegedly retaliatory employment action 
cannot, standing alone, support a finding of causal link. 
 
We have also held that the "mere passage of time is not 
legally conclusive proof against retaliation." Robinson v. 
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 
1993) ("SEPTA"). When temporal proximity between 
protected activity and allegedly retaliatory conduct is 
missing, courts may look to the intervening period for other 
evidence of retaliatory animus. For example, in SEPTA, we 
stated: "The temporal proximity noted in other cases is 
missing here and we might be hard pressed to uphold the 
trial judge's finding [of causal link] were it not for the 
intervening pattern of antagonism that SEPTA 
demonstrated." Id. at 895 (internal citation omitted); accord 
Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920-21. Here, Krouse did not offer 
any evidence that suggests that AMSCO's decision to place 
him on workers' compensation leave was in any way linked 
to his filing of an EEOC charge nineteen months earlier. 
Indeed, AMSCO returned Krouse to the channel welder 
position in June 1993 -- after Krouse filed his EEOC 
charge. Absent evidence of intervening antagonism or 
retaliatory animus, we conclude that the passage of time in 
this case is conclusive and that Krouse failed to establish 
a causal link as a matter of law. 
 
The district court also concluded that AMSCO articulated 
a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for its employment 
decision -- that Krouse could not perform to his expected 
level as a channel welder. The court concluded that Krouse 
failed to adduce evidence that would adequately rebut this 
explanation. Slip Op. at 24 n.9. Again, we agree. 
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AMSCO supported its decision to place Krouse on 
workers' compensation leave with uncontroverted evidence 
that Krouse performed at a level of between twenty-five and 
thirty percent, even though Krouse performed duties which 
were within Krouse's medical restrictions. Other fully 
trained channel welders performed at or above fifty percent 
performance efficiency. AMSCO also demonstrated that 
Krouse's frequent unscheduled absences resulted in 
substantial production delays and increased costs. 
 
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment in a 
pretext case, the plaintiff must produce "sufficient evidence 
to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer's 
proffered reasons were not its true reasons for the 
challenged employment action." Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 
1067. This is ordinarily done by demonstrating "such 
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, 
or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate 
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could 
rationally find them `unworthy of credence.' " Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 
F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 On appeal, Krouse does not seriously contest the 
evidence supporting AMSCO's decision to place Krouse on 
workers' compensation leave. Rather, Krouse contends that 
an allegedly similarly situated employee, Dan Oler, did not 
file an EEOC charge and was retained as a channel welder. 
The district court rejected this comparison, concluding that 
"Oler was not similarly situated to Krouse." Slip Op. at 23 
n.8. We agree. 
 
Oler is a channel welder who suffered a temporary injury. 
Oler's performance percentages during his recovery were on 
average substantially higher than Krouse's. Oler performed 
at a rate of twenty-three to eighty-five percent during his 
recovery, while Krouse's performance percentage remained 
between sixteen and thirty percent. Oler also showed 
significant improvement as time progressed; during the last 
month of his recovery, Oler's performance rate remained 
above sixty percent. In contrast, Krouse's disability was 
permanent, and Krouse admitted that he would not exceed 
thirty percent without assistance. As the district court 
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concluded, "Oler's performance efficiency was higher and 
showed a potential for improvement, whereas Krouse's did 
not." Slip Op. at 43. The fact that AMSCO retained Oler in 
the channel welder position does not, as a matter of law, 
demonstrate such weaknesses or implausibilities in 
AMSCO's articulated legitimate non-retaliatory reason for 
its decision to place Krouse on workers' compensation leave 
so as to permit a trier of fact to disbelieve AMSCO. 
 
As to Krouse's claim that he was denied a disability 
pension in October 1994 in retaliation for filing an EEOC 
charge in October 1992, the court concluded that there is 
"insufficient evidence as a matter of law to establish a 
causal connection between Krouse's filing of EEOC charges, 
or other protected activity, and his denial of a disability 
pension." Slip Op. at 24. Again, we agree. In addition to the 
lack of temporal proximity between the 1992 protected 
conduct and the 1994 decision to deny Krouse's application 
for a disability pension, there is no evidence that the 
members of the pension plan committee were aware of 
Krouse's protected activity.6 
 
As to Krouse's claim that he was denied a position under 
Section K of the collective bargaining agreement, the court 
concluded that Krouse failed to establish a prima facie case 
of retaliation. Slip Op. at 26. At the time Krouse requested 
a Section K position, the UAW/AMSCO collective bargaining 
agreement provided that "employees who have grown old in 
the service of the company, but who are no longer 
physically able to perform their usual work, will be given 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In addition, the decision to deny Krouse a disability pension was made 
by a bilateral committee of the independent Pension Board -- not 
AMSCO. The pension plan committee was comprised of three UAW 
representatives and one AMSCO representative. Although a joint labor- 
management committee may be a "covered entity" under the ADA, 42 
U.S.C. S 12111(2), Krouse did not name the pension plan committee or 
any union representatives as defendants in these actions. Krouse has 
not offered any evidence tending to support his theory that AMSCO can 
be held accountable for the decision to deny Krouse's application for 
disability pension benefits. As noted in the text, even if AMSCO could be 
implicated in the decision to deny Krouse's application for disability 
pension benefits, Krouse's claim would fail as a matter of law due to his 
inability to establish a prima facie case. 
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consideration by the company and an effort will be made to 
provide them with some sort of employment which they are 
able to do." AMSCO and the UAW agreed that, in order to 
qualify for Section K treatment, an employee must be at 
least fifty-five years of age with at least thirty years of 
AMSCO employment. 
 
It is undisputed that Krouse did not meet these 
requirements. These specific terms, while not in the 
language of the agreement itself, were agreed to by both 
AMSCO and the union and represent a reasoned 
interpretation of the phrase "employees who have grown old 
in the service of the company." There is no evidence that 
Section K positions were offered to individuals who did not 
meet the age and term of service requirements. Likewise, 
there is no evidence that Section K positions were 
discriminatorily withheld from qualified individuals with 
disabilities or from individuals who engaged in activity 
protected by the ADA. In other words, there is no evidence 
suggesting that AMSCO declined to provide Krouse with a 
Section K position in retaliation for Krouse's protected 
activity. 
 
Krouse's final ADA claim, his only claim brought under 
42 U.S.C. S 12112(a), is that Liberty Mutual and AMSCO, 
for the purpose of harassing Krouse, unlawfully required 
Krouse to undergo a functional capacity examination and 
filed a utilization review petition before the Pennsylvania 
Bureau of Workers' Compensation. As to AMSCO, the 
district court concluded that there was no evidence that 
AMSCO required Krouse to undergo a functional capacity 
examination or a utilization review. Slip Op. at 35. We 
agree. On appeal, Krouse does not point to any evidence of 
record that would establish AMSCO's liability under this 
cause of action. 
 
As to Liberty Mutual, the district court held that the 
insurance company was not a "covered entity" and was 
therefore not liable to Krouse under the ADA. Slip Op. at 
28-35. Section 12112(a) prohibits discrimination by a 
"covered entity." A "covered entity" is an "employer, 
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor- 
management committee." 42 U.S.C. S 12111(2). Krouse 
asserts that Liberty Mutual acted as AMSCO's agent and is 
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therefore Krouse's "employer" under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 12111(5)(A) ("employer" includes employer's agent). The 
district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence 
as a matter of law to support Krouse's agency theory. After 
carefully reviewing the record, we agree with the district 
court. Krouse's assertion that Liberty Mutual acted at the 
direction of AMSCO to harass Krouse in violation of the 
ADA is simply without foundation in this record. 7 On this 
record, Liberty Mutual is not an agent of AMSCO; it is 
therefore not a covered entity under the ADA. 
 
We find the district court's careful and exhaustive 
discussion of its merits-based reasons for granting the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment on Krouse's 
ADA claims to be correct as a matter of law, and we agree 
with the district court that the defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment on all of those claims. 
 
As Krouse's ADEA claims mirror his claims under the 
ADA, we may dispose of them without further discussion. It 
is sufficient for us to note that Krouse did not offer any 
evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that 
AMSCO's articulated reasons for its treatment of Krouse 
were a mere pretext for unlawful age discrimination. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In his appellate brief and at oral argument, Krouse referred to alleged 
evidence of an agency relationship taken from a deposition in the 
unrelated case of Cassidy v. American Sterilizer Co., Civ.A. No. 95-62- 
ERIE. Before the district court, Krouse relied on the same deposition 
testimony in an effort to reopen discovery. The district court denied 
Krouse's motion, concluding that Krouse (1) failed to explain how the 
testimony would preclude summary judgment and (2) did not provide a 
reasonable explanation as to why the "newly discovered evidence" was 
not previously obtained. Slip Op. at 54 (citing Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. 
of 
Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 511 (3d Cir. 1994)). Krouse does not argue on appeal 
that the district court erred in denying his motion to reopen discovery, 
and if faced with the question we would find that the court properly 
denied Krouse's motion. Accordingly, the Cassidy  evidence is not part of 
this record, and we do not consider it. 
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